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Why Pakistan Does Not Have a Counterterrorism
Narrative
Abstract
This article argues that not only has the counterterrorism (CT)
commitment in Pakistan been ad hoc in recent years, but that the
country's articulation of a softer type of CT response has been rhetorical
at best. The research further highlights that Pakistan’s attempts to craft
a scientifically structured counter narrative are neither traditional nor
within the country’s current CT capability. The article’s arguments are
analyzed through a guiding framework based on the compiled works of
various strategic communication experts, and helps illustrate the
narrative landscapes of al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban as explored
and pitched vis-à-vis the state’s counter-narrative paradigm. The findings
also probe the national mindset of Pakistanis amenability and appeal for
terrorism. The result of this research posits an underlying question as to
how then does Pakistan move forward in coping with increasing terrorist
threats within its borders while simultaneously developing a coherent
and fully functional counter terrorism effort in the future.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss1/5
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“It seems that everyone is talking about narrative these days… Yet, for all of 
this interest in narrative, there is little consensus about what it is and how it 
is used.”1  
Steven R. Corman 
 
Introduction 
Pakistan has been at war with terrorism for over a decade resulting in over 
55,000 citizen deaths, half a million injured, and a loss of over one hundred 
billion dollars to the national economy.2  Despite these heavy costs, it is ironic 
that the Taliban and their affiliates still enjoy the support of key political elites 
and certain sections of society.3  One reason for this heightened state of chaos 
is the highly charged religious discourse experienced in Pakistan over the 
meaning of the term jihad and its relationship within society.4  In fact, most 
Pakistanis draw distinct boundaries between the forms of violence attributed 
to their affiliations with various schools of jurisprudence and confessional 
doctrines.  Analogously, the youths in the poor and upper-middle classes 
throughout the country tend to view the world through a strict black and 
white lens, developing their radicalized beliefs from the clash of civilization 
paradigm.  They embrace radicalism  
 
“not necessarily because they understand the underlying ideology or 
comprehend the religious principles, but due to the fact that such ideas 
                                                     
1 Steven R. Corman, "Understanding the Role of Narrative in Extremist Strategic 
Communication," in Sarah Canna (ed.), Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific 
Method and Strategies (Lexington Park, MD: NSI, Inc., 2011), 40, available at: 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/files/attachments/95226/ucounterviolentextremism
finalapprovedforpublicrelease28oct11.pdf. 
2 "Fatalities in terrorism violence in Pakistan 2003-2014," South Asia Terrorism Portal, 
available at: 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm; 
Mariana Baabar,‘Pakistan suffered $103 bn loss due to terrorism,’ The News, 3 October 
2014, http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-33273-Pakistan-suffered-$103-
bn-loss-due-to-terrorism.   
3 “Arshad Mehmood: Hanged, then buried by crowds of well-wishers,” Dawn.com, 21 
December 2014; Yasser Latif HamdaniIn the cross hairs of the extremists The Hindu, 
April 28, 2014http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/in-the-cross-hairs-of-the-
extremists/article5953707.ece; Wasif Khan, “Extremism and mainstream Pakistan,” 
Dawn.com, 17 December 2012; Farida Shaheed, The occupation of mainstream cultural 
space in Pakistani society by politico-religious parties and groups, paper read in National 
Conference – Extremism, its impact on society: implications for women, 18-19 August 
2009, National Commission on the Status of Women, Islamabad, p.16 
4 Moonis Ahmar, "Sectarian conflict in Pakistan: some lessons from The Irish 
experience," IPRI Journal 10:1 (Winter, 2010): 50-76. 
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have become popular in the society and are not challenged by an 
alternative discourse.”5   
 
Also, there are clear divisions among political parties concerning the 
definition of terrorism and how best to counter its expansion.  Some support a 
general war on terror, but concurrently hesitate to categorize the subsequent 
violence as a result of terrorist's ethnicities.  Similarly, prevalent literature 
characterizing Pakistanis as both simultaneously sympathetic and rejecting 
terrorism confuses the overall discussion and exacerbates the tension seen 
within the general population.  The result is a multitude of conflicting 
viewpoints that makes it impossible for society to develop a cohesive narrative 
in order to counter the growth of extremism and fight terrorist activities 
within the country.6  This absence of a unifying national counter narrative 
limits Pakistan's ability to effectively fight terrorism within its borders, and 
creates an adverse effect outside of the country's sovereign territories. 
 
This article attempts to investigate the factors that explain reasons why a 
country like Pakistan that suffers enormously from terrorism, still continues 
to possess no cohesive response to counter the ongoing violence.  Two reasons 
posited for Pakistan’s inability to contend with this situation are: 1) that the 
counterterrorism (CT) effort itself has been an ad hoc commitment 
throughout the country until recently, and in certain segments of society has 
been rhetorical at best, 2) the crafting of a scientifically structured counter 
narrative—reckoned as part of a soft dimension of CT—involves specialized 
skills that are neither available nor find cultural amenability for assimilation 
within the country.  The article outlines a guiding framework that draws upon 
expert works—the scientific knowledge elaborated later—as a means to 
highlight defined and structural aspects of a narrative paradigm.  
 
Based on this input, potential elements required to compile a narrative, are 
sought from the frequently used strategic communication by the terrorist 
groups, and are composed in the form of a narrative.  The phenomenology of 
terrorism in Pakistan is then analyzed within the framework of scientific 
knowledge precepts and the identified militants' narratives.  Analysis of these 
specific narratives is beyond the scope of this article, but the question of how 
Pakistan copes with the terrorism threat despite an absence of a counter 
                                                     
5Ayesha Siddiqa, "Red Hot Chilli Peppers Islam – Socio-Political attitudes amongst Youth 
in Elite Universities in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi," Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 12, 13, 
25, available at: 
http://pk.boell.org/sites/default/files/downloads/Red_Hot_Chilli_Peppers_Islam_-
_Complete_Study_Report.pdf. 
6 Muhammad Amir Rana, "Perceptions of extremism," Dawn.com, September 8, 2013, 
available at:  http://www.dawn.com/news/1041383. 
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narrative is fully addressed.  Finally, this article's conclusion details all salient 
findings from this research and puts forth a few policy recommendations for 
future debate.  
 
The Guiding Framework for Narrative Development 
Writings by Steven Corman, Jeffrey Halverson, and various other authors 
denote the key aspects of the scientific knowledge used in the sphere of 
narrative construction for this article.7  Their theoretical rendering stands out 
in the contemporary scholarship as intellectually robust in its attempt to 
address key terrorism challenges.  Accordingly, this intellectual resource 
creates the foundation and has been used as the standard framework to weave 
together the various narratives used throughout in this paper.8 
 
A narrative, theoretically defined, is a coherent system of interrelated and 
sequentially organized stories—sequence of related events—that share a 
common rhetorical desire to resolve a conflict by establishing audience 
expectations according to the known trajectories of its literary and rhetorical 
form.9  More importantly, it is a system of stories that share themes, forms, 
and archetypes (See Figure 1).10  The stories comprising these narratives are 
inspired by real events rooted in the geo-contextual history and popular 
traditions of the targeted country.  According to Corman, every story in a 
narrative need not have exactly the same characteristics; however, they relate 
to one another in a way that creates a unified whole that is greater than the 
sum of its parts.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Narrative Elements 
                                                     
7 Other authors include H. L. Goodall, Rachel Briggs, Sebastien Feve, and Alex Smith. 
8 Rachel Briggs and Sebastien Feve, "Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent 
Extremism" Institute for Strategic Dialogue (July 2013): 6; Corman, "Understanding The 
Role Of Narrative..." 
9 Alex P. Schmid, "Al-Qaida’s Single Narrative and Attempts to Develop Counter -
Narratives: The State of Knowledge," The International Centre for Counter Terrorism 
(ICCT) (January 2014), available at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/Schmid-Al-
Qaida's-Single-Narrative-and-Attempts-to-Develop-Counter-Narratives-January-
2014.pdf; Halverson, Jeffrey, H. L. Goodall and Steven Corman, Master Narratives of 
Islamist Extremism (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2011. 
10 Corman, "Understanding The Role Of Narrative." 
11 Ibid. 
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Some narratives, whose stories are widely 
and consistently retold over time, rise to the level of 
These are also understood as 
include the Battle of Badr, 
and the Afghan Jihad to name a few
 
Conversely, counter-narratives are “attempts to
violent extremist messages, whether directly or indirectly through a range of 
online and offline means
groups and networks further along the path 
sympathizers, passive supporters or those more active within extremist 
movements.  These targeted program
de-mystify extremist propaganda in or
aims range from the de-
sowing of seeds of doubt among ‘at risk’ audiences potentially being exposed 
to or seeking out extremist content
 
In a real time environment
competitive character with 
striving to maintain strategic
particular case of terrorists
recruitment and fundraising
                                                     
12 Ibid. 
13 Youssef Aboul-Enein, "Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism," 
Blog Post, July 7, 2011.   
14 Briggs and Feve, "Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent 
49. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Nissen, Thomas Elkjer, "The two 'New Blacks'; Social Media and Narratives and their 
relations to MoE," in Strategic Communication in Counter Terrorism: Target Audience 
Analysis, Measures of Effect, and Counter Narrative Baselin
NATO COE DAT, June 2014).
17 Ibid.  
 
 
known and embedded in a culture 
master narratives
trans-historical chronicles.13  A few examples 
the French Revolution, the Pakistan movement
.   
 challenge extremist and 
.”14  These narratives are aimed at individuals, 
to radicalization, whether they be 
s explicitly deconstruct, delegitimiz
der to achieve a number of aims. 
radicalization of those already radicalized to the 
.”15   
, both narratives and their counters assume a 
each proponent—the terrorists and governments
 audience support.16  This support, in the 
, is to win over newer constituencies for 
 in support of their physical activities.17 
Small Wars Journal
Extremism," 6, 
e Report (Ankara, Turkey: 
 
66 
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e and 
 These 
—
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In order to contest or counter the militants’ narratives, experts advocate two 
methodological approaches.  The first is narrative coherence and the second is 
narrative fidelity.  The former is a methodical instrument used to assess 
communications based on whether a militant's stories (or implied stories) 
make sense structurally.  It considers factors like whether the sequence of 
events is consistent, the actors and their actions are plausible, and whether 
the resolution occurs as it should.  Narrative fidelity, on the other hand, 
involves assessing whether the stories “ring true,” or whether they are 
plausible with respect to the [factual] experiences and values of the 
audience.18  Invariably, all narratives by interest groups are based on facts 
that will, however, have elements of subjective manipulation blended into it 
to plead for sympathy and support.  This view is unanimously shared by 
leading scholars of strategic communication, presupposing the terrorist's 
expertise in this field or the investment of a great deal of time by them to 
represent the enemy with the utmost negativity.19 
 
This article departs a bit from this popular standpoint arguing that rather 
than twisting stories as a norm, it is also the phenomenology of perception of 
terrorist leadership—their experiential insight to accord meanings—about a 
grievance that is relied with equal emphasis to advance a narrative.20  For 
example, the verses extremists most frequently cite from the Quran deal with 
themes of victimization, dishonor, and retribution rather than those carrying 
offensive undertones, which shows close integration with the rhetorical vision 
of Islamist extremists.21  The exercise to establish infidelity of a narrative 
therefore needs to account for this aspect appropriately.  
 
 
Non-State Actors and Their Narrative Landscape  
Notable terrorist groups operating in and from Pakistan include al-Qaida 
Central, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), 
                                                     
18 Corman, "Understanding The Role Of Narrative." 
19 Thomas Koruth Samuel, "Reaching the Youth: countering the terrorist narrative," 
Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-terrorism, 2012, 31; Valentina Bartolucci 
and Steven R. Corman, "The Narrative Landscape of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb," 
2014, available at: http://csc.asu.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdf/csc1401-aqim-
narrative-landscape.pdf. 
20 Silvia Stoller, "Phenomenology and the Post structural Critique of Experience," 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17:5 (2009): 707-737; Travis Morris and 
John P. Crank, "Toward a phenomenology of terrorism: implications for research and 
policy," Crime, Law and Social Change 56:3 (October 2011): 219-242. 
21 Jeffry R. Halverson, R. Bennett Furlow and Steven R. Corman, "How Islamist 
Extremists Quote the Qur’an," Center for Strategic Communication 1202 (July 9, 2012), 
available at: http://csc.asu.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdf/csc1202-quran-verses.pdf. 
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East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), 
Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), 
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), reneged Kashmiri groups, autonomous 
Taliban groupings, the Baloch Liberation Army, and many others.22  This 
organizational and interest-related diversity creates a narrative landscape of 
terrorism in Pakistan that is not monolithic.  This variety emanates from the 
kaleidoscopic uniqueness of Pakistan, which the terrorist groups use 
according to discrete choice and interest.  
 
The repeated mention of Pakistan in historic statements and video messages 
by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri suggests the organization gives the country a 
relatively high degree of importance.23  This ensues from several 
underpinnings.  First, al-Zawahiri aspires to create a future jihad in the 
southern Russian Republics, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan to unite a nuclear 
Pakistan and the gas-rich Caspian region.24  Furthermore, Pakistan offers al-
Qaida an asset that is not available elsewhere.  This is due to this country’s 
reliance on a particular portrayal of Islam to justify its existence, as well as its 
policies.  By that measure, Pakistan allows Islamic opponents to claim any 
action construed by them as "un-Islamic," thereby making the country 
directly vulnerable to moral attack.   
 
Events such as the 2007 siege of the Red Mosque in Islamabad provided al-
Qaida ample opportunities to prove its point.25  For instance, al-Zawahiri uses 
the storming of the Red Mosque as a platform to accuse the West of 
conducting an "anti-Islam crusade," and to create a rallying cry to fight the 
U.S. backed Pakistan government and its military.26  The ideological nature of 
Pakistan also makes the country a suitable Islamic refuge for al-Qaida and the 
persecuted Muslims that further enhance its significance.27  The other non-
Pakistan groups such as IMU, IJU, and ETIM determine their respective 
narratives—mostly in the form of media statements—depending upon the 
type of alliance associated with al-Qaida, the Afghan Taliban, or local 
organizations.  Their narratives are further driven by the perceived wrong 
associated to the State of Pakistan.  The native groupings articulate their 
                                                     
22 C. Christine Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and 
Other Organizations," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27:6 (2204): 489-504. 
23 Amil Khan, "Pakistan and the narratives of extremism," USIP Special Report 327 
(March 2013). 
24 Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, "Ayman Al-Zawahiri's Knights under the Prophet's Banner: 
the al-Qaida Manifesto," Military Review 85:1 (January/February 2005), available at: 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_1_85/ai_n14695417/.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid; Hussain, Zahid, The Scorpion’s Tail (New York: Simon and Schuster, November 
2010), 119. 
27 Ibid. 
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narratives based on the outlook of a particular issue—for example, jihad 
against the State, sectarianism, anti-faith beliefs, anti-U.S. sentiment, anti-
India rhetoric, and anti-democracy movements.  
 
The narrative categorization, accordingly, spans multiple types to include 
master narratives, and several general narratives that can be bifurcated into 
national, episodic and meta—or sectorial—narratives.  These have been 
adduced from a careful review of existing sources to include statements by al-
Zawahiri and TTP leadership, motivational literature, visual material, 
transcripts, media releases, websites and social media expositions operated by 
militants.  Identified below are the summarized and collected texts from the 
above sources.  The texts presented retain the original spirit of the messages. 
Discretion has been used to contextualize pieces of texts where they seem 
fitting to make the narrative intelligible. 
 
Al-Qaida’s Narrative on Pakistan 
Conventionally, al-Qaida has a global narrative built around the American-
Zionist-Crusaders war framework against Islam, which has its regional 
denominations propounded by al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-
Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Qaida in the Indian 
Subcontinent (AQIS).28  In the case of Pakistan, al-Qaida has enunciated 
several narratives engendering different persuasions.  Altogether these can be 
reckoned as a unifying framework of explanations that provides Pakistanis 
portrayal of a reality that resonates with their historical experiences, 
memories, religious reverence, national sentiments and larger grievances 
against the State.  Oddly however, in building the master narrative on 
Pakistan, al-Qaida fundamentally departs from its popular rhetoric—
American-Zionist-Crusaders—by grounding it instead in the history of 
partition of British India and the Kashmir issue.  Conceptually, it challenges 
the very basis of creation of Pakistan and envisions resolution of a conflicted 
situation by dispensing with democracy in favor of Khilafat (vice regency).  
There are two interlaced variants that flow from this master narrative.  They 
employ the American-Zionist-Crusades underpinning, besides integrating 
religion, political system and nuclear status of the country.  All of the 
narratives are fairly realistic and are not easy to challenge.29 
 
                                                     
28 Bartolucci and Corman, "The Narrative Landscape of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb." 
29 Mansfield, Laura, His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. 
Ayman Al Zawahiri, (New Jersey, TLG Publications 2006), 284, 326-334; Aymen Al-
Zawahri, Al-Subah wal Qandeel, (trans) Maula Abdul Samad, Idar-e-Hateen, 16, 26, 179-
180, 183-187. 
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1) Master Narrative.  Muslims who struggled in India aspired for a 
separate homeland where their integrity and rights were protected. 
The country was hijacked by the Western backed secular community 
who assumed its leadership.  The creation of Pakistan was the work of 
this irreligious elite installed to further western interests.  Hence, this 
was not the Pakistan that was sought by South Asian Muslims.  It was 
and still is an un-Islamic State that function on the basis of an un-
Islamic constitution and diseased political system that contravenes the 
fundamental dictates of sharia.  Corrupt ruling elites of this rentier 
state have been exploitative and are the U.S. stooges. Promises to 
make Pakistan an Islamic state have been a farce that also obstructs 
the liberation of Kashmir.  If you do not want to support us, at least 
accept our argument in order to stop helping the corrupt rulers, and to 
help topple their government in order to establish Khilafat.  
 
2) Variant I.  In the war on terrorism, Pakistan is the principal base and 
vanguard of crusaders against Islam on the subcontinent, South Asia 
and the Middle East.  The country’s leadership is exerting to prove its 
loyalty more than others to the United States in this war.  The Pakistan 
army is corrupt, and its officers and men should not heed to unethical 
orders of their leaders.  
 
3) Variant II.  India, which is allied with the United States and the Jews, 
is the candidate in the modern American-Zionist-Crusader's war 
against Islam designed to neutralize Pakistan's nuclear program, to 
weaken jihad in Kashmir, and to divide Pakistan.  Jihad against Russia 
was decreed by the Pakistan clergy. Jihad against the United States 
should also be viewed as a duty according to sharia.  Hence, Muslims 
are obligated to help the Mujahedeen—the knights—who are engaged 
in jihad in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.  Besides, it is 
the responsibility of every Pakistani to expel crusaders from their land.  
 
 
 
Taliban National Narrative  
The Taliban national narrative generally draws upon al-Qaida’s central theme 
of the American crusader—termed by TTP as the world's biggest crusade.  
This narrative is coupled with a few similarities, but maintains individuality 
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by embracing developments and events prevailing at the national scene.30  
Structurally, it is more thematic compared to singleness of thought in the 
narratives crafted by al-Qaida.  Distinct features of this narrative consist of: 
  
1) The Pakistan state is un-Islamic, murderous, and is the enemy.  The 
Pakistani government is an apostate and a U.S. protégé that usurps the 
people’s power.  
2) The Taliban are the knights of Tawhid and Jihad.  
3) Democracy is kufar and needs to be replaced by sharia dispensation.  
4) Being heretics and sinners, Shias are kafir.  
5) The war on terror is a persecution of tribal Muslims by the Pakistan 
army and will be avenged.  
6) The media is dajal—the false messiah—and is engaged in misleading 
the masses.  
 
Meta-Narratives 
Articulated by ideologues—not including the Taliban—meta-narratives 
include narratives on sectarianism, blasphemy and interfaith issues, and are 
relatively coercive in tone exploiting pro-Sunni sentiments pervading 
Pakistan.31  For example, Shias are sternly told that ‘they are mistaken’. 
Likewise, any negative comments against the Blasphemy Law are in turn 
viewed as blasphemous and may result in the death penalty for violators.32  
Identically, a great deal of content expressed toward religious minorities often 
stems from a feeling that they do not respect Islam and Muslims.33 
 
The State of the Knowledge, State’s Counter Narrative, and 
Phenomenology of Terrorism in Pakistan 
The State of Knowledge 
The literature on militancy, terrorism, and extremism produced by Pakistani 
writers generally use the word narrative notionally or adjectively when 
                                                     
30 Jihade Pakistan, available at: http://jihadepakistan.blogspot.com/; see also: 
http://jihadepakistan.blogspot.com/2014/09/blog-post_95.html#more; and 
http://jihadepakistan.blogspot.com/2012/11/blog-post.html.  
31 Christine C. Fair, Neil Malhotra and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Islam, Militancy, and Politics in 
Pakistan: Insights From a National Sample," Terrorism and Political Violence 22:4 
(2010): 495–521.  
32 “No Muslim should attend the funeral or even try to pray for Salman Taseer.” This was 
the pronouncement by a broad alliance of the clergy of Jamaate Ahle Sunnat Pakistan (as 
well as some select deobandi ulema), which erstwhile represented the large and moderate 
Barelvi sect. The assassin of Governor Taseer was lionized.  
33 Azhar Hussain, Ahmad Salim and Arif Naveed, “Connecting the Dots: Education and 
Religious Discrimination in Pakistan,” United States Commission on International 
Religious Freedom November 2011. 
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characterizing militants’ behavior and their hate messages.  Practically, the 
narrative debate in its academic sense is non-existent with the exception of a 
handful of news reports, reviews, and writings that have used the narrative 
nomenclature in varied connotations.  These encompass analyses of the 
extremists’ narratives, and the factors contributing to the creation of 
emotional resonance among Pakistanis.  It also includes the so-called state 
narratives depicted in Pakistan media to counter them.34  Apart from an odd 
piece, this scholarship is generic without scientific treatment of the subject. 
Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Challenges edited by Moeed Yusuf claims to 
break new ground by approaching CT holistically.  It rightly identifies the 
crucial importance of what it calls ‘Cyberia’, or what aids extremists in 
pursuing their agendas through exploitation of weakness of the state’s 
response.  The writing’s accent is on cybercrime and cyber terrorism, but the 
strategic communication that the chapter on Cyberia engages is limited.35 
 
Tradition and Appeal of the State’s Counter Narrative 
There have been efforts to respond to the ideological tide of terrorism.  First, 
was the neologism, “Strategy of Enlightened Moderation,” that was 
introduced by General Pervez Musharraf in 2002.  Not wholly a counter 
narrative in the technical sense, it became a buzzword globally, but has now 
vanished due to its temporary lure being a superficial, over simplistic and 
apologetic concept.36  Second, was the tradition of generating anti-terrorist 
rhetoric, by key national figures—government, armed forces and anti-Taliban 
clergy—who inconsistently ramped up their rhetoric during the run up to 
military operations and active hostilities in Swat and South Waziristan 
(2009), and North Waziristan (2014).   
 
These traditions essentially contain policy statements in the form of press 
releases, televised addresses, key speeches of government officials (in the 
form of reports), newspaper reports, and interviews.37  Occasionally, liberal 
members of civil society have also joined this effort.  These transitory 
endeavors can be loosely counted as part of the strategic communication by 
                                                     
34 Shamil Shams, "The Clash of Narratives Swat Military Operation against the Taliban.” 
Working Paper Series # 120," Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) October 
2011; Ahmed Rashid, “Cry, the beloved country,” New Republic May 26, 2011; Amil Khan, 
"Pakistan and the narratives of extremism," USIP Special Report 327; Asad Munir, 
"Narratives on the TTP," Dawn.com, July 6, 2013. 
35 Khan, Zafarullah, "Cyberia: A new war zone for Pakistan’s Islamists," in Moeed Yusuf 
(ed), Pakistan Counter Terrorism Challenges, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2014), 169. 
36 Major Irfan Ahmed Malik, Pakistan Army, "Islam, Terrorism and the Strategy of 
Enlightened Moderation," (Master Thesis: U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, 2005). available at: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA437501. 
37 Shams, "The Clash of Narratives...Series # 120." 
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the state and the miniscule segments of society, albeit these attempts have 
been reactive and fractured in hindsight.  A statement prior to the 2009 
military operations in Swat by the former Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, 
amplifies this assertion.38  The argument expounded in the statement, only 
makes a case for endorsing the need for undertaking a military operation 
without a structured follow up by official tiers. 
 
“We tried our best to resolve the issue peacefully. What else could be 
the proof of government’s sincerity and love for Islam other than the 
fact that it did everything to implement ‘Nizam-i-Adl’? We took the 
issue to the parliament which approved the peace agreement 
unanimously, and the president signed the bill without any delay.”39  
 
A recent development includes the promulgation of the National Internal 
Security Policy 2014-2018 (NISP) by the Ministry of Interior in early 2014.  
This policy—a step in the right direction—is to be implemented by the 
National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA).  The policy recognizes the 
significance of a national narrative in its framework to eradicate extremism 
and terrorism.40  Ironically, what it connotes as elements of this narrative—
tolerance, harmony, and the right of the people to make religious, political 
and social choices—are factually near-replication of the fundamental rights 
enshrined in articles 2-28 of the Constitution of Pakistan.  While such a 
pluralistic national narrative will be warranted for forging national cohesion, 
this in no way can be considered a substitute in the narrative paradigm under 
review that the NACTA should be undertaking to neutralize terrorists’ 
propaganda.   
 
Phenomenology of Terrorism in Pakistan 
Some scholars argue that the state’s Islamic ideology and its so-called 
strategic discourse does not [or cannot] complement anti-extremism 
narratives; on the contrary, it favors extremism.41  This observation should be 
viewed through the attempts of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) to re-write 
Pakistan’s self-understanding as a political entity from a Muslim to an Islamic 
state.42  His reformation drive according to a particular worldview radically 
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altered the curriculum, particularly social sciences.  The country’s leading 
historians were mobilized in constructing a past for their new nation that 
would set it apart from the Indus Valley Civilization involving, among other 
things, the relegation of a diverse but vibrant composite cultural and 
intellectual legacy to the backdoor.43  This reductionist discourse denied the 
existence of different cultural variations, and instead focused on producing a 
polemic essentialism.44 
 
Concurrently, there is a pervasive culture of conspiracy theories that have 
long flourished in Pakistan and that profoundly affect the statecraft.45  In fact,  
 
“the entire public discourse is so sodden with ludicrous conspiracy 
theories they are minimally rational.  In part, these conspiracy theories 
are the work of the army itself, which...has been spreading the line 
about India’s role [in fomenting violence] in an effort to discredit the 
Pakistani Taliban.”46   
 
The only unifying characteristic of these reactions is that they are excuses 
created to avoid the necessary conclusions—or evoking critical questions—and 
ultimately provide space for the Taliban to continue their reign of terror.47  
This practice relies on typical Pakistani psyche rooted in sentimentalism 
wherein an ordinary Pakistani can be quickly provoked and have a mental set-
up that cannot sustain a long and involving rational argument.48  
 
The key factor that accounts for this symptom is underlined by the lack of 
critical thinking and existing education milieu especially Pakistan's public 
schools and colleges who use textbooks and a curriculum predicated on 
constructed myths.  In essence, the education system—public and private, 
religious and secular—develops a rigidly authoritarian mindset that desires to 
dominate the rest of the world, and a belief in the unidimentionality of 
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reality.49  This representation, in the absence of a state apparatus, regulation, 
and credible educational institutions is hardly a matter of priority with the 
state and has been allowed to grow and flourish spawning misperception and 
irrationality.50  The confusion of views by most of the people on the issues 
such as jihad, extremism, radicalization, and terrorism is a corollary of this 
structural void.51  
 
Therefore, despite tremendous human and material loss, countering 
terrorism has not found strong appeal within political ranks, as well as at the 
grass roots level.  The Pakistani people, contrary to leaders in Islamabad, still 
believe America's war is against them and not the militants in the tribal areas.   
Suicide bombings and deadly violence are the subsequent backlash.  This 
confusing narrative has resulted in widespread tolerance for the Taliban 
among commoners and elites alike.52  It is also within this framework that the 
drone narrative has produced the intense anti-American feelings.  Drone 
attacks are portrayed to the Pakistani people as one of the greatest evils to 
have ever engulfed the country, largely by the Pakistani media and the 
country’s politicians.  The discourse is predominantly based on the 
assumption that drones are U.S. tools that violate Pakistan’s sovereignty, and 
kill “thousands” of innocent civilians while also fueling militancy.  With 
emphasis solely on civilian deaths and not on militants, this narrative has 
resonated among wider sections of society.53 
 
A more significant impediment facing the CT campaign in Pakistan is the 
selective application of the notion of terrorism.  For example, the proxy war in 
Kashmir is a declared jihad whereas violence by the Taliban is selectively 
viewed as terrorism.  The narrative of attaining azadi or freedom for Muslim 
Kashmiris living under Indian (e.g., Hindu) oppression is crucially important 
in Pakistani domestic politics and society.54  For instance, Pakistan’s leaders, 
civilian and military alike, refer to the militant groups which claim to fight on 
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behalf of Kashmir’s freedom as ‘‘freedom fighters’’ rather than as terrorists.55  
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is a case in point.  It is both nationally and 
internationally labeled as a terrorist outfit, but due to its well entrenched anti-
India rhetoric which goes well with the Pakistani mindset of historically 
opposing Hindu domination, LeT enjoys a wider acceptance among the 
populace.   
 
This ideological demeanor is better understood from the prism of 
nationalism, wherein violence assumes an adapted meaning to serve national 
ends.  Furthermore, the average Pakistanis often relate to, justify, and refuse 
to unconditionally condemn the ideologies driving violent extremism—even 
when it directly impacts their lives in the form of suicide bombings or militant 
attacks.56  Similarly, not everyone condemns sectarianism.  The same holds 
true for systematic violence against other religious minorities.  The ordinary 
mindset is also reflected in the belief that too many of the Taliban are 
basically ‘good people’, only demanding a just system; they are “our 
misguided brothers” but brothers nevertheless.57  Some go to the extent of 
calling the Taliban the first line of defense against India, while others call 
them terrorists.58  These observations also explain why religion is so profusely 
built into narratives by the terrorists.  This is due to its potential to 
emotionally reverberate with an audience that has been raised since 
childhood on an intellectual diet of state-sponsored messaging presenting 
Pakistan as an experiment in the service of Islam and its army as the guardian 
of that Islamic identity.59 
 
Coping with Terrorism  
While Pakistan has demonstrated a semblance of CT—driven mainly through 
hit and trial strategy—it has lacked structured input and participation by civil 
society including higher seats of learning.  As a result of the absence of a clear 
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and comprehensive policy by the government, political leaders have left the 
task of both the formulation and execution of counter terrorism essentially in 
the hands of the army leadership.60  Other than engaging in rhetoric, the 
governing elites by and large remained divorced over how the military 
conceptualized terrorism, and what rules of engagement it followed.  
 
The absence of a consensual CT vision is not the only problem; there also 
exists a wide gulf between the civilian law enforcement and military efforts to 
combat terrorism.61  Although the Pakistani government has instituted a 
national internal security strategy [NISP] complemented lately with a NAP 
(National Action Plan) against terrorism, a holistic understanding of the 
problem is missing from policy and politics.62  Intriguingly, the NACTA—the 
country’s supreme CT coordination body only recently institutionalized under 
an act of the parliament (No. XIX of 2013)—has yet to assume its envisaged 
shape due to administrative and capacity issues.63 
 
Apart from the NACTA, at least five strategic and policy research 
organizations are named in Pakistan that the government funds.  Still, little is 
known about consultation for governmental policy design on issues of 
national importance.64  Viewed in totality, this state of mayhem sufficiently 
explains reasons of inefficacy of the government’s counter terrorism policy.  
For instance, government representatives have repeatedly affirmed the 
decision to fight against the proliferation of terrorism or the threat of 
terrorism.65  Unfortunately, this is a less narrative-based decision-making 
process and more a political posturing tactic.66  Out of the entire lot of the 
state’s institutions, the military is the most organized and well equipped in 
terms of its counter terrorist capabilities, yet one has not heard of any counter 
narrative flowing from them for public consumption other than summaries of 
routine terrorist activities.67  Interestingly, this has occurred while the 
Taliban, the LeT, and other militant groups have become more media savvy in 
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developing their respective narratives.68  Unlike the extremist communication 
efforts, strategic communication endeavors to counter extremism in Pakistan 
typically do not deploy messages built on Pakistan’s narratives corresponding 
to narratives deployed by terrorists.69 
 
Conclusion  
The discussion indicates serious gaps in the CT infrastructure of Pakistan 
including a lack of competence by concerned organs to defeat terrorism 
through soft countering approaches.  The narratives used by Jihadis are 
largely based on facts, but there are still significant portions that contain 
elements of fiction.  For instance, appraisals through the lens of narrative 
coherence and fidelity or ‘deconstruct, delegitimize, and de-mystify’ 
parameters can or could have exposed deceit and falsehood.  There is no 
evidence suggesting a professional approach based on these methodologies to 
develop counter and alternative narratives to deal with complexity spawned 
by terrorism in Pakistan.  Hence, there is a virtual vacuum for the terrorist 
organizations to propagate their narrative at will.  
 
Analysis and marketing on a sustained basis in order to build technical 
capacity to engage in narrative development is imperative to pull the masses 
out of the narrative rationality of the extremists to an informed worldview.  It 
needs emphasis that the narrative rationality can trump logical reasoning 
(especially in the case of conspiracy theories) because it is an alternate way of 
thinking about the world that has close connections with desires and 
emotions, and is deeply involved in how we make sense of events in everyday 
life.70  Pakistan at this juncture is ideally cast for such maneuvering by forces 
inimical to the national and public interests.  
 
Ad-hoc approaches have worked so far with mixed outcomes, but it may not 
sustain the emerging setting beset by more fluidity and uncertainty.   
Essentially, no worthwhile peace is likely without a unified stand by the 
Pakistani citizenry against terrorism and the total ownership of the war by the 
population.  This calls for putting in practice the NISP as soon as possible, 
and addressing the existing weaknesses in the system.  If this is not 
accomplished, more vulnerable minds will fall prey to the allure of existential 
attractions propagated by the terrorists.  
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